Maintenance, Dower (Mahr) and Stridhan

• Interim and permanent alimony in matrimonial cases: Section 24 (pendente lite; either spouse; decided within 60 days of service of notice); Section 25 (permanent alimony; at the time of or after the decree; may be varied). No fixed formula; the Supreme Court says the amount depends on status, needs, income and conduct (Rajnesh v Neha, 2020; Vinny Parmvir Parmar v Parmvir Parmar, 2011; Kiran Jyot Maini v Anish Pramod Patel, 2024).

• Rajnesh v Neha (2020): all courts must require an affidavit of assets and liabilities; interim maintenance runs from the date of application; overlapping claims under different laws must be disclosed and adjusted; execution can be done through civil and criminal means. The Supreme Court in 2026 decisions on alimony (Deepa Joshi, Ruchika Rathi, Anju Jain; reported) repeated that there is no fixed formula and that the one-time settlement (‘clean break’) approach can be used with Article 142 (verify).

• Who can claim: wife (including a divorced wife who has not remarried), legitimate or illegitimate minor children, major children with physical or mental abnormality or injury, and father or mother, if unable to maintain themselves, from a person with sufficient means who neglects or refuses to maintain them.

• Ceiling: the earlier Rs 500 limit was removed in 2001; there is no ceiling now.

• Disqualification of wife (125(4)): living in adultery; refusing without sufficient reason to live with husband; living separately by mutual consent.

• Procedure: Magistrate First Class; interim maintenance allowed; Sections 126–128 CrPC: procedure, alteration and enforcement; BNSS: Section 144 (maintenance), Section 145 (procedure), Section 146 (alteration), Section 147 (enforcement). The Supreme Court (Gaurav Joshi, 16 April 2026, reported) held that EMIs and loan commitments cannot defeat a maintenance obligation (verify).

• Secular and religion-neutral: Bai Tahira v Ali Hussain Fissalli (1979), Fuzlunbi v K. Khader Vali (1980), Shah Bano (1985), Mohd. Abdul Samad v State of Telangana (2024).

• Vijaya Manohar Arbat v Kashirao Rajaram Sawai (1987): a married daughter with means has a duty to maintain her parents under Section 125.

• During marriage: husband must maintain (nafaqa: food, clothing, lodging) even if the wife has means; the wife loses it if she is disobedient (nashiza) without lawful reason.

• After divorce (classical law): only during iddat (three months or three menstrual courses; until delivery if pregnant; for a widow four months and ten days).

• Shah Bano (Mohd. Ahmed Khan v Shah Bano Begum, 1985, Constitution Bench, Chandrachud CJ): Section 125 CrPC applies to Muslim women; mahr is not a sum payable ‘on divorce’ in lieu of maintenance; maintenance of Rs 179.20 per month. The case also urged a UCC.

• Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act 1986: Section 3: reasonable and fair provision and maintenance within the iddat period, mahr and property; Section 4: if no relatives, the State Waqf Board pays; Section 5: option of Section 125 by joint affidavit.

• Danial Latifi v Union of India (2001): upheld the 1986 Act but read it down: ‘reasonable and fair provision’ means a lump sum covering her future needs and may extend beyond iddat; Section 125 remains available.

• Iqbal Bano v State of UP (2007), Shabana Bano v Imran Khan (2010): divorced Muslim woman can claim under Section 125 even after iddat if she has not remarried and is unable to maintain herself.

• Mohd. Abdul Samad v State of Telangana (10 July 2024): Justices Nagarathna and Masih: a Muslim woman, including one illegally divorced by triple talaq, can seek maintenance under Section 125 CrPC; the remedy is in addition to the 1986 Act and the 2019 Act’s subsistence allowance; Section 125 is secular and religion-neutral. The All India Muslim Personal Law Board criticised it.

• 2019 Act, Section 5: subsistence allowance for the woman subjected to talaq-e-biddat, fixed by a Magistrate.

• Christians: Divorce Act 1869 Sections 36 (alimony pendente lite) and 37 (permanent alimony); Section 125 CrPC.

• Parsis: Parsi Act Sections 39 (pendente lite) and 40 (permanent alimony).

• SMA: Sections 36–37.

• DV Act 2005: monetary relief (Section 20), residence orders (Section 19). Satish Chander Ahuja v Sneha Ahuja (2020) overruled S.R. Batra v Taruna Batra (2006): a woman can claim residence in a house owned by in-laws if she has lived there in a domestic relationship; Hiral P. Harsora v Kusum Narottamdas Harsora (2016): ‘adult male’ struck from definition of respondent (women can be respondents); Prabha Tyagi v Kamlesh Devi (2022): actual residence at the time of filing not required.

• Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act 2007: tribunal-based maintenance for parents and senior citizens.

• Dowry Prohibition Act 1961: Section 3 (giving or taking dowry: at least five years’ imprisonment and fine at least Rs 15,000 or the value of the dowry, whichever is more), Section 4 (demanding), Section 6 (dowry to be held in trust for the woman); BNS Section 80 (dowry death: minimum seven years); BSA Section 118 (presumption of dowry death).

Definition: a sum of money or other property which the wife is entitled to receive from the husband in consideration of the marriage (Hedaya; Mulla). Mahmood J. in Abdul Kadir v Salima (1886): dower is not the price of consideration but an obligation imposed by law on the husband as a mark of respect for the wife.

Amount: minimum under Hanafi law is 10 dirhams; Maliki 3 dirhams; Shia and Shafi’i: no fixed minimum. No maximum. If marriage is dissolved before consummation: half of the specified dower is due; if none was specified, a consolatory gift (mutah). Dower is a debt: the wife is an unsecured creditor of the husband’s estate ranking equally with other creditors; heirs are liable only to the extent of the estate in their hands, in proportion to their shares. Widow’s right of retention: if she is lawfully in possession of the husband’s property, she can retain it until her dower is paid, but she does not acquire title (Maina Bibi v Chaudhri Vakil Ahmad, PC 1924; Kapore Chand v Kadar Unnisa, SC 1953). Remission: wife can remit (hiba-i-mahr) with free consent. Dower and the 1986 Act: mahr is to be paid at divorce in addition to maintenance (Section 3).

Dower vs dowry: dower is the wife’s legal right in Muslim law and is not prohibited; dowry is illegal under the Dowry Prohibition Act 1961.

Meaning: a woman’s absolute property over which she has full right of ownership and disposal. In classical Hindu law (Manu, Yajnavalkya, Narada, Katyayana) stridhan covers: gifts before the nuptial fire (adhyagni), at the bridal procession (adhyavahanika), gifts of affection (pritidatta, from in-laws), gifts at the time of leave-taking or obeisance (padavandanika), gifts from relatives (saudayika), subsequent gifts (anvadheyaka), and (in some texts) bridal price (sulka). The Mitakshara gives the widest meaning (including property by inheritance, partition, purchase, and her own earnings), the Dayabhaga narrower; the Bombay school (Vyavahara Mayukha) is in between.

• Section 14 HSA: any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the Act, is held as full owner and not as limited owner; ‘property’ includes inheritance, devise, partition, maintenance or arrears, gift, own skill or exertion, purchase, prescription, and her stridhan. Section 14(2): property acquired by gift, will, instrument, decree or award which prescribes a restricted estate is excepted. V. Tulasamma v Sesha Reddy (1977): a widow’s right of maintenance converts a limited estate into an absolute estate under Section 14(1); Section 14(2) is a narrow exception. Eramma v Verrupanna (1966), Bai Vajia v Thakorbhai Chelabhai (1979): possession is a requirement.

• Husband’s position: he has no right over stridhan during marriage except in an emergency, and must restore it (Pratibha Rani v Suraj Kumar, 1985: stridhan is the wife’s sole property; refusal to return it is criminal breach of trust under Section 406 IPC, now BNS Section 316). Rashmi Kumar v Mahesh Kumar Bhada (1997) reaffirms. The Supreme Court in 2024–25 judgments (reported; for instance Maya Gopinathan v Anoop S.B., verify) again held that stridhan is exclusively the woman’s and that the husband and in-laws hold it only in trust.

• Section 27 HMA: court may pass orders about property presented at or about the time of marriage which belongs jointly to both parties.

• Succession to stridhan: Section 15 HSA (see topic 8): the pattern depends on the source (parents’ or husband’s family).

• Christians and Parsis: Married Women’s Property Act 1874 protects a married woman’s separate property (not applicable to Hindus, Muslims, Buddhists, Sikhs and Jains).