General Exceptions (BNS ss.14-44; IPC ss.76-106)

• Maxim: ignorantia facti excusat, ignorantia juris non excusat. A mistake of fact made in good faith gives protection; a mistake of law does not.

• Conditions: the mistake must be of fact (not law), must be bona fide, and the accused must have believed himself bound by law (s.14) or justified by law (s.17) to do the act.

• Cases: Chirangi v. State of M.P. (1952) (the accused killed a man in the dark believing he was a tiger attacking his child; acquitted); State of Orissa v. Ram Bahadur Thapa (1960) (the accused killed a woman believing her to be a witch; a mistaken belief that killing a witch is lawful is a mistake of law, so no protection); Waryam Singh v. Emperor (1926).

• Related English cases: R v. Tolson (1889) (bigamy; honest and reasonable belief in husband's death was a defence).

• A judge is protected for acts done in the exercise of power given by law (or reasonably believed to be given), and persons acting under a court order are protected for acts done under it even if the court lacked jurisdiction, provided they believed in good faith it had.

• Linked laws: Judicial Officers Protection Act, 1850; BNSS provisions on protection of judges and public servants.

• An act is excused when it is the result of accident or misfortune and done without criminal intention or knowledge, in the doing of a lawful act, in a lawful manner, by lawful means, and with proper care and caution. All five are cumulative.

• Illustration: A is at work with a hatchet; the head flies off and kills a man nearby. If there was no want of proper caution, A has committed no offence.

• Examination point: proper care and caution is the key phrase; an accident arising from a quarrel or from an unlawful act (e.g., a brawl where the blow was deliberate) is not covered.

• An act is not an offence merely because it is done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause harm, if it is done without criminal intention to cause harm, in good faith, to prevent other harm to a person or property.

• The question is whether the harm to be prevented was of such a nature and so imminent as to justify the risk (fact finding).

• Illustration: a ship captain who cannot save his vessel from collision with a boat full of passengers changes course and sinks a boat with two persons; no offence.

• English contrast: R v. Dudley and Stephens (1884): necessity is no defence to murder (killing a cabin boy to survive at sea).

• Under 7: absolute immunity (doli incapax, conclusive presumption). 7 to 12: immunity only if of immature understanding (capacity to judge nature and consequences), decided case by case. 12 and above: ordinarily full responsibility under the Sanhita, but children below 18 are dealt with by the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015; a child 16 to 18 who commits a heinous offence (minimum punishment of seven years or more) may be tried as an adult after a preliminary assessment by the Juvenile Justice Board (Shilpa Mittal v. State of NCT of Delhi, 2020 treated offences with minimum less than 7 years but maximum above 7 as "serious", not "heinous").

• Nirbhaya case effect (2012): the 2015 Act was passed after the public debate over a juvenile offender.

• Text in essence: nothing is an offence which is done by a person who, at the time of doing it, by reason of unsoundness of mind, is incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or that he is doing what is either wrong or contrary to law.

• Origin: M'Naghten rules (1843), after Daniel M'Naghten killed Edward Drummond (he suffered delusions). Indian law follows the M'Naghten rule, with "contrary to law" added.

• Legal vs medical insanity: law requires cognitive incapacity at the time of the act; not every mental illness qualifies. Irresistible impulse and volitional incapacity are not recognised.

• Burden: on the accused; the standard is preponderance of probabilities; the court considers conduct before, at and after the offence (motive, preparation, concealment, escape). Concealing the weapon or fleeing shows knowledge of wrongfulness.

• Cases: Dahyabhai Chhaganbhai Thakker v. State of Gujarat (1964) (the burden and that unsoundness must exist at the time of the act); Ratan Lal v. State of M.P. (1971); Sheralli Wali Mohammad v. State of Maharashtra (1973); Hari Singh Gond v. State of M.P. (2008) (legal insanity versus medical insanity); Surendra Mishra v. State of Jharkhand (2011); Bapu @ Gajraj Singh v. State of Rajasthan (2007); Elavarasan v. State (2011).

• Procedure: BNSS provisions (the successor to CrPC ss.328-339) govern trial of persons of unsound mind; a person found insane is detained in a mental health facility or released to a relative on security.

• Involuntary intoxication (the drink or drug was administered without his knowledge or against his will) is a defence if, by reason of it, the accused was incapable of knowing the nature of the act or that it was wrong or contrary to law.

• Voluntary intoxication is no defence; but for offences needing a specific intent or knowledge (e.g., murder under s.101), the accused is treated as having the same knowledge as a sober person, unless the intoxicant was administered without his knowledge or against his will. However, intent can be negated by evidence that intoxication was so great that he lacked the intent (Basdev v. State of PEPSU, 1956: the court must consider whether the accused had the necessary intent; drunkenness is only a factor).

• English cases: DPP v. Beard (1920), DPP v. Majewski (1977) (voluntary intoxication is no defence to crimes of basic intent).

• s.25 (IPC 87): a person above 18 can consent to an act not intended or known to be likely to cause death or grievous hurt; e.g., fencing, boxing.

• s.26 (IPC 88): act not intended to cause death, done in good faith for the person's benefit with consent, even if death or grievous hurt may result (e.g., a surgeon performing a risky operation with consent).

• s.27 (IPC 89): act in good faith for the benefit of a child under 12 or a person of unsound mind with guardian's consent (but not intentional death, or an act the doer knows likely to cause death except to prevent death or grievous hurt, etc.).

• s.28 (IPC 90): consent is not valid if given under fear of injury or misconception of fact (known to the doer), or by a person of unsound mind or intoxicated, or by a child under 12 unless the context requires otherwise.

• s.29 (IPC 91): consent is no excuse for acts that are offences independently of harm (e.g., abortion in violation of the law).

• s.30 (IPC 92): act in good faith for a person's benefit without consent (emergency surgery on an unconscious patient where no guardian is available in time).

• s.31 (IPC 93): a communication in good faith is not an offence merely because it causes harm (a doctor telling a patient he will die, which causes shock and death).

• Cases: Poonai Fattemah v. Emperor (1869) (snake-charmer; death by snake bite was not excusable because the act was likely to cause death); Dr. Suresh Gupta v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi (2004) and Jacob Mathew v. State of Punjab (2005) (medical negligence only criminal if gross).

• Protects a person compelled to do an act by threats that reasonably cause apprehension of instant death if he refuses. Excludes murder and offences against the State punishable with death. The accused must not have voluntarily placed himself in a situation in which he became subject to the compulsion (e.g., joining a gang knowingly).

• De minimis non curat lex: an act causing or intended to cause slight harm that no person of ordinary sense and temper would complain of is not an offence. Case: Veeda Menezes v. Yusuf Khan (1966) (the Court treated the test as objective and fact-specific, looking at the nature of the injury, the intention and the circumstances). Not applicable to serious offences or where the harm is more than trivial.

Principle: the State cannot protect each person at every moment, so the law gives each person a right to defend body and property. It is a right of defence, not retribution, and rests on necessity.

Key doctrines and cases

• Reasonable apprehension, not actual danger, is the test; the court weighs the situation as seen by a person of ordinary prudence in the moment (Vidhya Singh v. State of M.P., 1971; the court does not weigh the right in "golden scales").

• No right against more harm than needed; if exceeded, the accused loses the full protection and is liable under BNS s.101, Exception 2 (IPC s.300, Exception 2): culpable homicide not amounting to murder if death is caused by exceeding the right in good faith and without premeditation.

• Aggressor cannot claim it.

• Right is not available where there is time to approach authorities (Jai Dev v. State of Punjab, 1963).

• Burden: accused need not plead it expressly if circumstances show; the court may infer it (Munshi Ram v. Delhi Administration, 1968; Rizan v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2003).

• Summary of principles: Darshan Singh v. State of Punjab (2010) is the leading modern summary (the right is preventive, not punitive; every citizen can use it; defendant need not run away; injuries on accused and prosecution witness are evidence; a person faced with imminent peril need not measure the force with nicety).

• Other cases: Puran Singh v. State of Punjab (1975); Mohinder Pal Jolly v. State of Punjab (1979) (a factory owner who fired at a rioting crowd of workers; the Court examined how far the right of private defence extends against a mob), Deo Narain v. State of U.P. (1973) (the right continues as long as the danger).