20.1Constitutional Doctrines#
In brief
Basic Structure Doctrine Origin: Kesavananda Bharati v.
- Basic Structure Doctrine
- Doctrine of Eclipse
- Doctrine of Severability
- Pith and Substance Doctrine
- Doctrine of Occupied Field
- Doctrine of Implied Powers
- Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity
Basic Structure Doctrine Origin: Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973). Parliament can amend the Constitution under Art. 368 but cannot destroy its basic structure. Recognised elements: supremacy of Constitution, republican and democratic form, secular character, separation of powers, federal character, judicial review, free and fair elections, dignity of individual, unity and integrity of nation, parliamentary system, rule of law, equality, social justice, and independence of judiciary.
Doctrine of Eclipse Origin: Bhikhaji Narain Dhakras v. State of MP (1955). Pre-constitutional laws inconsistent with Fundamental Rights are not void but dormant — eclipsed. They automatically revive if the constitutional bar (FR) is amended to remove the inconsistency. Does NOT apply to post-constitutional laws (those are void ab initio under Art. 13(2)).
Doctrine of Severability Origin: R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala v. Union of India (1957). Only the unconstitutional part of a law is struck down; the rest remains valid if separable and independently workable. Test: Would Parliament have enacted the law even without the invalid portion?
Doctrine of Colourable Legislation Origin: K.C. Gajapati Narayan Deo v. State of Orissa (1953). Even where a legislature appears to act within its powers, if in substance it is encroaching upon another legislature's domain, the legislation is 'coloured' or 'disguised' — and is invalid. The label does not matter; the substance does.
Pith and Substance Doctrine Origin: Profulla Kumar Mukherjee v. Bank of Khulna (1947, PC); State of Bombay v. F.N. Balsara (1951). If a law incidentally trenches on another legislature's field, courts look at its true nature and character. If it falls substantially within the legislature's competence, it is valid despite incidental encroachment.
Doctrine of Occupied Field When Parliament legislates exhaustively on a Concurrent List subject, it occupies the entire field — States cannot legislate on the same subject. Related to Art. 254 repugnancy.
Doctrine of Pleasure (Article 310) Government servants hold office during the pleasure of the President/Governor. Subject to Art. 311 procedural safeguards. Does NOT apply to SC/HC judges (who hold during good behaviour) or Constitutional authorities with specific security of tenure.
Doctrine of Implied Powers Powers not expressly conferred but necessarily implied from express provisions. Applied to fill lacunae in the Constitution.
Doctrine of Prospective Overruling Origin in India: Golak Nath v. State of Punjab (1967) — Subba Rao CJ. When the SC overrules a previous decision, it can declare that the overruling shall operate only prospectively — not affecting past transactions. Prevents injustice from retroactive application of a new legal rule.
Doctrine of Double Jeopardy (Article 20(2)) No person shall be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once. Narrower than the common law autrefois acquit/convict — applies only to prosecution AND punishment, not to mere prosecution. Disciplinary proceedings + criminal proceedings on the same facts do NOT violate Art. 20(2).
Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity The State is not liable for acts done in the exercise of sovereign functions. In P. & O. Steam Navigation Co. v. Secretary of State for India (1861), a distinction was drawn between sovereign and non-sovereign functions. Post-Constitution, the SC in Kasturi Lal Ralia Ram Jain v. State of UP (1965) upheld the distinction. Later cases (N. Nagendra Rao & Co. v. State of AP, 1994) significantly eroded it — State cannot claim immunity for tortious acts of its servants.
Doctrine of Res Judicata in Constitutional Matters In Devilal Modi v. STO (1964), the SC held that res judicata applies to writ petitions also. A petition dismissed on merits creates res judicata — but a petition dismissed on grounds of alternative remedy does not bar a fresh petition.